The Allocation of Economic Capital in Opaque Financial Conglomerates by Mierzejewski, Fernando
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Allocation of Economic Capital in
Opaque Financial Conglomerates
Fernando Mierzejewski
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
3. July 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9432/
MPRA Paper No. 9432, posted 3. July 2008 14:11 UTC
The Allocation of Economic Capital
in Opaque Financial Conglomerates
Fernando Mierzejewski†
July 2008
†Faculty of Economy and Applied Economy, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Naamsestraat
69, 3000 Leuven, Belgium
Email: Fernando.Mierzejewski@wis.kuleuven.be
Abstract
The capital structure of firms that face restrictions on liquidity (i.e. that cannot
hedge continuously) is affected by the agency costs and moral-hazard implicit in the
contracts they establish with stockholders and customers. It is demonstrated in this
paper that then an optimal level of capital exists, which is characterised in terms
of the actuarial prices of the involved agreements. The capital principle so obtained
explicitly depends on risk and expectations and it can be naturally applied to allocate
balances inside multidivisional corporations. In particular, an optimal decentralised
mechanism is defined, which stimulates the exchange of information between central
and divisional administrations. A novel model of capital is thus formulated, which
extends the classic theoretical framework (sustained by the well-known proposition
of Modigliani and Miller and the model of deposit insurance of Robert Merton) and
integrates the financial and actuarial theoretical settings.
Key words: Economic Capital; Capital Allocation; Deposit Insurance; Distorted Risk
principle; Value-at-Risk.
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1 Introduction
Financial intermediaries establish contractual liabilities with customers to attract funds that
are spent on securities. The managers of these companies create value to shareholders when
the market value (X) of net assets, equal to assets (A) minus liabilities (D), is greater than
zero (i.e. when X = A − D > 0). Some companies that fear they can obtain negative
balances at the end of the investment period maintain cash provisions, in the form of cap-
ital, to guarantee that all outstanding liabilities will be honoured. Several types of capital
are distinguished in the literature, depending on the purpose it serves to the institution
and on the criterion employed to fix its level. Thus, on the one hand, cash capital repre-
sents a balance required to execute transactions, while working capital additionally includes
operational expenses.1 On the other hand, regulatory capital is defined according to some
accounting standard (as in Basel, 2004), while equity corresponds to the portion of reserves
1See, for example, Williams et al., 2002, and also Howells and Bain, 2005.
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provided by shareholders. Finally, many authors speak of economic and risk capital when
some particular criterion, based on economic or statistical considerations, is proposed.
In lines with Merton (1974, 1977), the demand for capital will be corresponded to a
demand for deposit insurance in this paper.2 Accordingly, the terms economic and risk
capital will be indistinctly used to refer to the smallest amount required to insure the value
of net assets against a loss in value relative to the risk-free investment of those net assets. In
this context, the difference between economic and equity capitals represents a balance that
is supplied by managers in attention to some solvency requirement. Three main components
of the capital structure can thus be distinguished: a net liability contracted with customers,
an amount of equity supplied by shareholders and a cash balance provided by managers.
Since the economic capital is equal to the sum of the last two components, the problem of
capital allocation can be roughly corresponded to the determination of the proportions of
the portfolio of assets that are funded by means of internal and external debt.
Holding capital imposes an opportunity cost on firms because these funds could be alter-
natively employed on profitable investments. Such costs lead financial institutions to prefer
(external) debt and accordingly demand as less capital as possible. In fact, in a seminal
paper, Modigliani and Miller (1958) claim that, if at any moment firms can borrow and lend
any amount of capital at a single interest rate, they can adjust their balance sheets when-
ever is needed and hence cash provisions impose a cost without any benefit. Then rational
decision-makers (who maximise value) should demand no capital at all.
More specifically, Merton (1997) states that the presence of credit-sensitive customers
obliges opaque institutions (whose investment activities are not fully observed by outsiders)
to rely on a third-party guarantor, who agrees to honour the outstanding liabilities when
bankruptcy is declared.3 Then the market values of equity and debt can be respectively
corresponded to the values of a call and a put option on the value of assets, with exercise
price equal to the value of debt, which implies that the market value of the firm (or the market
value of the assets’ portfolio) is independent of the capital structure, as predicted by the
MM-proposition (see also Miller, 1998). A fundamental assumption for this mechanism to
work is that capital and financial securities are continuously traded in competitive markets.
The correspondence of capital to deposit insurance implies that the hypothesis of perfect
hedging can be reestablished by imposing that a unique price exists for the insurance of
any single claim. Under such circumstances, managers are indifferent between hedging and
insurance and are certainly indifferent about the amount of economic capital. However,
hedging and insurance cannot be regarded as equivalent tools in practice. As a matter of
fact, although competitive forces in capital and security markets lead transactions to be
always produced at a unique price, this is not always the case of insurance markets, where
non-standarised policies are transacted (see Goovaerts et al., 2005, and Venter, 1991).
Hence, liquidity restrictions may arise from two different sources. In the first place, firms
are not always able to trade continuously in capital and security markets. Then the moral-
hazard arising due to the opaqueness of financial intermediaries induces the appearance of
premiums over the market cost of capital, which should be established on an actuarial basis.
2The meaning and scope of this interpretation will be clarified later in Sections 2, 3 and 5.
3The presence of credit-sensitive customers increases external controls and monitoring due to the moral-
hazard implicit in the administration of deposits. See also Ross (1989).
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Secondly, the buyers and sellers of insurance can maintain different perceptions about risks
and can accordingly assign different prices to their corresponding guarantees.
A model will be presented in this paper to characterise the demand for reserves of financial
institutions that access to capital markets where hedging is restricted to some extent and
individuals differ on their expectations about the riskiness of the transacted securities. This
model extends the classic theoretical framework that assumes perfect competition. It can in
fact be demonstrated that the capital structure does affect the value of firms under conditions
of imperfect competition. The optimal cash balance can then be determined, in such a way
that the market value of the firm, defined as the difference between the actuarial prices of
equity and the default claim, plus the return offered by a non-risky bond, is maximised. A
precise description of the conditions under which the capital structure matters is provided in
this way, and the limits of the Modigliani and Miller invariance propositions are then clearly
stated. This is the main contribution of this paper.4
Within a multi-business environment, differences in expectations between central and
divisional managers lead to discrepancies about the optimal levels maintained by subsidiaries.
Inefficiencies then arise in the form of under- and over- investment, respectively corresponded
to the cases when too much and too few capital is demanded. This is a most important issue
in corporate finance, for in the former case favourable investment opportunities can be lost,
while in the later case firms can damage their credit quality (as perceived by customers)
if too much risk is assumed. Since the optimal capital principle proposed in this paper
explicitly depends on risk and expectations, it proves to be a convenient tool to describe such
interactions inside corporations. In fact, two optimal allocation principles can be defined on
this basis, respectively related to centralised and decentralised administrations. This is the
second main contribution of this paper.5
At the empirical level, the capital and allocation principles derived from the extended
setting show important advantages over other principles found in the literature (see Albrecht,
2004). Thus, in the first place, they are founded on economic fundamentals. Secondly, since
they are expressed in terms of the quantile function of underlying risk, they can be applied
to any kind of probability distributions and hence, they are suitable both to finance and
insurance applications. The quantile function is actually well-known by researchers and
practitioners and it has been actually recommended by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (2004). Finally, again at the theoretical level, the allocation rule proposed by
Merton and Perold (1993) — which is based on the market price of deposit insurance with
unrestricted hedging — can be obtained as a particular case of the optimal capital principle
(Section 10). The most relevant facts of the classic theory of capital are thus extended.
2 Agency Costs and Moral-Hazard in Opaque Finan-
cial Institutions
In the model of Modigliani and Miller (1958), the set of financial securities is divided into
equivalent classes, in such a way that the returns offered by any two assets in a same class are
4The optimal capital principle is presented in the first part of the paper, in Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5.
5The optimal allocation principles are presented in Sections 6, 7, 8 and 9.
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proportional to each other — or equivalently, every two assets belonging to the same class
can be regarded as perfect substitutes for each other. Firms fund their assets’ portfolios with
own capital (K) or issue bonds offering a constant yield per unit of time (delivering some
cash flow D at maturity). Then the market price of portfolios containing assets belonging
to the same class can at most differ in a scaling factor α:
V = A = K +D = α · r
Both assets and bonds are supposed to be traded in perfect markets, which means that
both the transactions of securities and bonds can be performed at any moment and without
restrictions. Therefore, the proportions of capital and debt can be modified at any moment
without affecting the value of the firm (which is always equal to A = α · r) and hence the
market valorisations of firms are always independent of the underlying capital structure.
In subsequent papers, Modigliani and Miller prove that the irrelevance of the capital
structure can still be maintained in the presence of taxes6 and dividends deliver to share-
holders (Modigliani and Miller, 1961). The critical assumption supporting these results is
that managers and stockholders share expectations about the future payoffs of the net as-
sets’ portfolio. Informational asymmetries between managers and stockholders lead to the
appearance of agency costs inside institutions. The cost of equity might depend on the level
of capital under such circumstances.
Informational asymmetries are also present in the relationship between managers and
customers. Indeed, as pointed out by Merton (1997), financial companies tend to be opaque
institutions, for their investment activities are not fully observed by outsiders. As a con-
sequence, it is difficult for customers to assess the risk assumed by intermediaries and for
the later to effectively reflect their solvency state. On the other hand, since the benefits of
financial intermediation (such as economies of scale and reduced transaction costs) can be
effectively transmitted to customers only if intermediaries can convincingly assure that their
liabilities are free of default, both the availability and the price of capital are dependent on
the perceptions of customers regarding the credit quality of the borrowing institutions. Such
services are said to be credit-sensitive by Merton. In other words, because of the moral-
hazard implicit in the relationship between managers and customers, firms are obliged to fix
their capital structures in order to increase their honourability at the eyes of investors (see
also Cummins and Sommer, 1996, and Myers and Read, 2001).
On these grounds, Merton states that the practice of financial intermediation requires
a third-party guarantor (whose willingness and capability to meet obligations are beyond
question) to assure the safety of deposits. This role might be assumed by another financial
company, as well as by some governmental division. The terms of the contract are the follow-
ing. When bankruptcy is declared (i.e. when X = A−D < 0), the firm defaults its assets to
the guarantor and the guarantor meets the bondholders’ claims. In this case, nothing is left
to shareholders. A second contract is simultaneously established with shareholders, promis-
ing to pay the value of net assets when this balance is positive (i.e. when X = A−D > 0) in
exchange of a certain amount of equity capital. Consequently, shareholders and bondholders
6In fact, tax regimes tend to favour the use of debt, the only exception being some regimes of double
taxation. See also Modigliani and Miller, 1963, and Miller, 1977.
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respectively receive the payments max(0, A − D) and D at the maturity date, while the
guarantor has to afford the cost min(0, A−D).
In other words, while shareholders own the right to buy the portfolio of assets at the
price D at maturity, the firm owns the right to sell the portfolio of assets to the guarantor
at the price D. Equivalently, we can say that shareholders are the owners of a European
call option C(A,D) on the value of assets with exercise price equal to the value of debt,
while managers are the owners of a European put option P (A,D) on the value of assets with
exercise price equal to the value of debt. Bondholders, on the other hand, are the owners
of the sure stream D. Thus, information asymmetries impose on managers the obligation
of combining three kind of securities: the firm itself (or the portfolio of assets held by the
firm), a promise to pay at any event its outstanding liabilities, and a particular security
guaranteeing the payment to creditors when bankruptcy is declared. Such a portfolio can be
built by simultaneously hiring debt in the form of a zero coupon bond, selling a call option
to shareholders and buying a put option to the guarantor (Merton, 1974 and 1977).
In fact, since the value of the call option C(A,D) corresponds to a cash flow payed by
shareholders in exchange of the surplus accrued by the portfolio of net assets, it can then be
regarded as the market value of equity. In a similar way, the term D · e−rT − P (A,D) can
be regarded as the market value of the guaranty, for it represents the net stream received
by the firm from the guarantor. From the Put-Call parity theorem (see Black and Scholes,
1973, Merton, 1974, and also Cummins and Sommer, 1996) we obtain that:
V = A = C(A,D) +D · e−rT − P (A,D) (1)
Therefore, though both the price of equity and the price of the guarantee depend on the
underlying capital structure, the market price of the firm is always equal to the value of assets,
whatever the chosen funding strategy (as predicted by the MM-proposition, see Miller, 1998).
Consequently, even in the presence of informational asymmetries, the capital structure
does not affect the market valorisations of firms, as long as trading in assets and bonds
takes place continuously in time. However, this cannot be always said of real markets.
The major hypothesis of this paper thus states that financial institutions cannot hedge
fully and accordingly, that hedging cannot be regarded as a perfect substitute for insur-
ance. This means, specifically, that deposit insurance cannot be corresponded to an op-
tion claim and that Equation 1 cannot be invoked to support the MM-proposition. In-
stead, an actuarial approach should be introduced to determine the fair price of the claims
(A−D)+ := max(0, A−D) and (A−D)− := −min(0, A−D) respectively held and afforded
by shareholders and guarantors at the end of the investment period. This will be formally
accomplished in Sections 3, 4 and 5.
3 The Optimal Capital Structure
Both asset and liability claims will be regarded as random variables in the following, while
the market value of net assets will be expressed as the product of the level of investment I
and some random pertubation X:
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A−D = I ·X ⇔ X := A−D
I
(2)
Then the level of investment can be regarded as the principal of the net portfolio. The level
of capital will be also represented as a proportion of the level of investment:
K = I · k ⇔ k := K
I
(3)
The ratio k represents a capital-to-investment or a cash-to-risk ratio. It determines the
proportion of internal financing of the firm. In this context, the determination of the capital
structure involves choosing the proportions of internal and external financing when building
solvent or equilibrated portfolios (satisfying A−D > K).
Let us analyse the payments received at the maturity date by some firm that maintains
insurance and equity contracts in the terms stated in the previous section. Thus, on the one
hand, one agreement is celebrated between the firm and a guarantor, which obliges the later
to honour the total capital loss I · (X + k)− = I · min(0, X + k) in exchange of a certain
premium payed by the former at the beginning of the investment period. Simultaneously,
shareholders pay a certain price to managers at the beginning of the investment period, in
exchange of receiving the random capital profit I · (X − k)+ = I · max(0, X − k) at the
end. The capital K is invested in a banking account to obtain the risk-free return r0 (in
other words, it is converted to a risk-free zero-coupon bond with internal return r0). The
payments received by the firm at maturity are then given by:
I · (X − k) + r0 ·K if X ≥ k
I · (X + k) + r0 ·K if X ≤ −k
0 if −k < X < k
(4)
Accordingly, when X ≥ k the firm can afford its debt and pay a surplus to shareholders,
i.e. the firm is solvent in this case. By contrast, when X ≤ −k the capital K is deliver to
the guarantor who has to afford the residual loss I · (X + k). Shareholders receive nothing
in this case. Finally, when −k < X < k the firm cannot return the total amount of capital
to shareholders, although the total debt attracted from customers can be honoured and the
guaranty is not invoked. Stockholders might decide to sell their shares or to call for portfolio
restructuring under such circumstances.
We have already pointed out that risk can be completely suppressed through hedging
if cash and securities can be traded to any desired extent in the market. Indeed, under
such circumstances, the prices (per unit of investment) of the contracts established with
shareholders and guarantors are respectively given by the prices of a call and a put option
on the value of the random capital return X with exercise price equal to the cash-to-risk
ratio k, in such a way that the put-call parity can be invoked to obtain (as in Equation 1):
X = C(X, k) + k · e−r0T − P (X, k)
where T denotes the time to maturity. Thus, the value of the firm does not depend on the
cash-to-risk ratio k as long as continuos rebalancing of portfolios is allowed. When this is not
possible due to liquidity restrictions, the prices of the contracts established with stockholders
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and guarantors should be determined on an actuarial basis. Accordingly, the price of equity
and the cost of bankruptcy will be respectively corresponded to the terms E
[
(X − k)+
]
and
E
[
(X + k)−
]
in the following, for these terms represent the fair or actuarial prices of the
underlying exposures (see Goovaerts et al., 1984). Hence the value of the firm at the end of
the investment period (as perceived by managers) is given by:
V = (E [(X − k)+]−E [(X + k)−]) · I + r0 ·K
Within this context, the cash-to-risk ratio k affects the net return on investment and hence
the value of the firm.
Given some fixed level of investment I, every rational manager must choose the capital
structure that maximises the firm’s value per unit of investment V/I:7
max
k
E [(X − k)+]− E [(X + k)−] + r0 · k (5)
The solution to the maximisation problem can be determined by applying Lagrange optimi-
sation. The first-order condition actually leads to:
d
dk
E [(X − k∗)+]− d
dk
E [(X + k∗)−] + r0 = 0
The mathematical expectations of the corresponding excess return terms are defined as:
E [(X − k)+] =
∫∞
k
(x− k) · dFX(x) =
∫∞
k
(x− k) · fX(x)dx
E [(X + k)−] = −
∫ −k
−∞
(x+ k) · dFX(x) = −
∫ −k
−∞
(x+ k) · fX(x)dx
(6)
where FX and fX respectively denote the cumulative and the density probability functions
of the random variable X, which are defined as (see, for example, De Finetti, 1975):
FX(x) = P{X ≤ x} =
∫ x
−∞
dFX(x) with fX(x) =
dFX
dx
(x) > 0 ∀ x
Hence, every random variable is uniquely determined by its corresponding probability dis-
tribution FX . Besides, an equivalent characterisation is provided by the cumulative or tail
(also known as survival) probability distribution TX(x) = 1− FX(x), ∀ x, defined as:
TX(x) = P{X > x} =
∫ ∞
x
dFX(x) with
dTX
dx
(x) < 0 ∀ x
As the derivative of the expected excess return requires to derive an integral operator with
respect to a variable affecting its limits of integration, the Leibnitz’s rule can be applied:
∂
∂z
∫ v(z)
u(z)
φ(z, x) dx =
∫ v(z)
u(z)
∂φ(z, x)
∂z
dx+ φ (z, v(z)) · v′(z)− φ (z, u(z)) · u′(z) (7)
7A similar approach is proposed by Froot et al., 1993. In this model, the fundamental motive for the
existence of an optimal balance is that output variability is undesirable when investment presents diminishing
marginal returns — i.e. when output is expressed as a concave function of the level of investment — because
funding and investment plans can be affected in a costly way under such circumstances. See also Froot and
Stein, 1998, and Froot, 2007.
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Accordingly,
dE [(X − k)+]
dk
= −P {X > k} = −TX(k) =⇒ d
2E [(X − k)+]
dk2
= −dTX(k)
dk
(8)
and also, since P {X ≤ −k} = P {−X > k}:
dE [(X + k)−]
dk
= −P {−X > k} = −T−X(k) =⇒ d
2E [(X + k)−]
dk2
= −dT−X(k)
dk
(9)
Therefore, the first-order condition leads to the following equality in terms of the negative
and positive tail probability functions:
T−X(k
∗) + r0 = TX(k
∗) (10)
or equivalently, in terms of the cumulative probability functions:
1− F−X(k∗) + r0 = 1− FX(k∗)
Since the term E [(X − k)+] represents the expected excess over capital, the term TX(k) =
−dE [(X − k)+] /dk corresponds to the magnitude of the reduction in free-cash-flow pro-
duced when adding an additional unit of cash to the stock of capital — instead of in-
vesting it in the portfolio of assets. Similarly, the terms E [(X + k)−] and T−X(k) =
−dE [(X + k)−] /dk respectively represent the cost of bankruptcy and the marginal gain
in value obtained due to the reduction in the cost of bankruptcy (and hence in the price
of the guarantee) when an additional unit of investment is added to the stock of cash (see
Equations 8 and 9). Therefore, according to Equation 10, the optimal level of capital is
determined at the point where the marginal gain equals the marginal loss in value due to
allocating one additional unit of investment to the stock of reserves instead of spending it
on assets. In other words, capital is demanded up to the point where the marginal return on
capital (to the left-hand side of Equation 10) is equal to the marginal return on investment
(to the right-hand side of Equation 10).
The existence of a solution to the optimisation problem of Equation 5 can be mathemat-
ically assured as long as the second derivative of the objective function is lower than zero,
i.e. as long as (from Equations 8 and 9):
d2E [(X − k∗)+]
dk2
− d
2E [(X + k∗)−]
dk2
< 0 ⇔ dT−X(k
∗)
dk
<
dTX(k
∗)
dk
and since TX = 1 − FX , and also dFX(x)/dx = fX(x) = P{X = x} ∀x, we finally obtain
that the second-order condition can be expressed in terms of the mass probability densities:
P {X = k∗} < P {X = −k∗} (11)
We thus arrive to the (reasonable) conclusion that liquidity provisions provide a benefit
to firms only when the probability that attaining a capital loss of a certain magnitude is
greater than the probability of obtaining a capital gain of the same magnitude. In particular,
symmetric probability distributions (around the expected value) satisfy:
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P {X = E[X]− x} = P {X = E[X] + x} ∀x
Therefore, within the class of symmetric probability distributions, the objective function of
the maximisation problem is concave when E[X] < 0 but convex when E[X] > 0, and hence
a maximum is attained only when E[X] < 0. Consequently, capital is beneficial to financial
institutions only when E[X] < 0.
4 Liquidity Restrictions in Capital Markets
As demonstrated in the previous section, the capital structure may well affect the market
value of financial institutions in the presence of liquidity restrictions. Liquidity restrictions
arise, in the first place, because the portion of capital provided by stockholders is determined
in a regular frequency (such as yearly, quarterly or monthly) and cannot be modified until
the end of the period. Since the level of equity and the frequency of revisions are the result
of negotiations between managers and shareholders, changing some agreement is costly and
can reduce the market valorisation of the firm. On the other hand, choosing some risk-based
capital principle (such as the one defined by Equations 5 and 10) implies that the amount
of economic capital must be subject to constant revisions if the riskiness of the series of the
value of the net-assets’ portfolio is varying — i.e. if the series of capital P&L of the net-
assests’ portfolio is non-stationary. This means that managers are obliged to rely on some
market of cash balances (or inter-bank loans) in order to maintain a total level of capital
that is consistent with the underlying exposure.
Albeit preferring external debt reduces the controls imposed by shareholders, this strategy
also raises the costs associated to moral-hazard (on the side of customers) and bankruptcy.8
Hence the controls and monitoring established by customers and regulators are expected to
increase in this situation. Consequently, when deciding their capital structures, firms have to
face a trade off between paying high spreads because of opaqueness and signaling costs on the
one hand, and sacrificing potential competitive advantages when maintaining idle balances
on the other.9 As established in Equation 10, the optimal cash-to-risk ratio k∗ must be
determined at the point where the opportunity cost of capital, equal to the reduction of the
excess of return TX(k
∗) = −dE [(X − k∗)+] /dk, just offsets its marginal benefit, equal to
the reduction in the cost of bankruptcy plus the risk-free interest rate, i.e. T−X(k
∗) + r0 =
−dE [(X + k∗)−] /dk + r0.
Another kind of liquidity restrictions arises due to the fact that the opportunity cost of
capital, that is perceived by managers as the reduction in the price of equity induced when
certain level of capital is maintained, is not necessarily equal to the return r they have to pay
to borrow in the market of cash balances (i.e. in general TX(k
∗) 6= r). Indeed, while the cost
of equity reflects the agency costs between managers and stockholders, the market capital
cost r is determined according to the capacity and willingness to pay of the borrower and it
8This is especially true in highly leveraged firms, where managers have strong incentives to take risk. See
Jensen, 1986. The role of bankruptcy costs in the determination of the capital structure has been already
mentioned by Stiglitz, 1972 (see also Stiglitz, 1988).
9In the words of Stephen Ross (1989), firms and institutions are monitored and controlled through a
complex set of implicit and explicit contractual relations. See also Fama, 1980.
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then reflects the moral-hazard in the relationship with customers. It depends, in particular,
on the capital structure of the borrower institution, i.e. (as it is normally established in the
corporate finance literature, see Williams et al. 2002) on the leverage ratio of the borrower
institution, which is normally defined as K/D and also D/I = (I −K)/I, or equivalently,
on its cash-to-risk ratio k = K/I.
As a matter of fact, to determine the price of loans, the creditors of opaque organisa-
tions rely on their own research and monitoring, as well as on the information published in
the media and the risk categorisations provided by specialised (private and governmental)
institutions. The credit ratings observed in practice normally include a finite number of
categories. Within each class, every firm is supposed to face the same risk of default and
hence every firm is allowed to borrow at the same interest rate (as in the MM-proposition),
in such a way that the more the concerns of creditors about the credit capacity of firms in
a certain class, the higher the level of the corresponding cost of capital and vice-versa. This
means that lenders cannot discriminate perfectly and that borrowers can remain in the same
class as long as they do not drastically modify their capital structures. In other words, as
long as firms do not drastically vary their cash-to-risk ratios, they can regard the market
capital cost as a constant.
In order to explicitly introduce the cost of capital r in the model, let us consider a firm
that belongs to a certain class determined by the capital cost r and maintains the cash-to-risk
ratio k. The cost of equity of this kind of firms is given by:
E[(X − k)+] = E[X+]− r · k ⇔ E[X+]−E[(X − k)+]
k
= r (12)
Jensen (1986) has noticed that internal monitoring is more intense when positive balances
are obtained at the end of the investment period and cash is at disposal in excess of what
is required to fund every ongoing (solvent) investment project. In this case, it is said that a
firm owns free-cash-flow. Accordingly, although the agency costs inside financial firms can be
certainly reduced by diminishing the amount of equity, there is also a pressure to raise these
costs since higher amounts of free-cash-flow are obtained in this case. In Equation 12, such
effect is completely transferred to the moral-hazard effect, for reductions in the cash-to-risk
ratio must be necessarily followed by increments in the market capital cost.
However, if (as previously suggested) borrowers are grouped in a finite number of cate-
gories, Equation 12 is likely to be violated and differences are expected between the internal
and external estimations of the cost of capital:
∆ =
E [X+]− E
[
(X − k)+
]
k
− r 6= 0
Accordingly, capital is regarded as too expensive for those firms that obtain ∆ < 0, for in this
case maintaining the cash-to-risk ratio k produces a loss that is lower than the alternative
cost of borrowing the same balance in the market. These firms prefer to demand reserves
instead of relying on external finance. Conversely, capital is cheap for those firms that obtain
∆ > 0, for they have to incur in a higher loss if they maintain some cash balance. These
firms prefer to demand no capital at all.
The case ∆ > 0 actually represents the situation of firms that obtain gains over the
level of capital and dispose of free-cash-flow. In the model of Jensen (1986), frictions and
10
mismanagement are specially severe within firms disposing of high amounts of free-cash-flow,
resulting from the competition, between managers and shareholders, to take control of the
profits generated by the company.10 The level of capital demanded by such firms can be
described by means of the second-order condition. Indeed, given any cash-to-risk ratio k,
we expect the probability P{X = k} to be higher for firms that obtain higher amounts
of free-cash-flow, and that eventually this probability exceeds P{X = −k} when a certain
capital threshold is surpassed. As we have already noticed, such turning point is found at
k = E[X] in the case of symmetric probability distributions. In any case, there will always
be institutions with sufficiently high cash in excess for whom to maintain a single unit of
capital induces a net loss in value. Those firms prefer to demand no capital at all and do
not consequently internalise the cost of bankruptcy. Accordingly, not only agency costs are
expected to be high inside firms with abundant free-cash-flow, also the incentives to provide
capital cushions to guarantee their outstanding liabilities are non-existant in these firms, a
situation that may aggravate the moral-hazard in the relationship between managers and
customers.
In conclusion, short-term stickiness inherent in the equity contracts established with
stockholders, as well as in the credit categorisations determined by lenders in the markets
of cash balances, prevent financial institutions from continuously adjusting their capital
structures. Thus, on the one hand, demanding additional equity from shareholders may well
increase the agency costs inside the institution. But on the other hand, raising the amount of
external debt may raise the bankruptcy costs faced by the institution and the moral-hazard
inherent in their relationship with creditors. More explicitly, diminishing the cash-to-risk
ratio always leads the bankruptcy costs term E[(X + k)−] to rise, and sometimes, when the
magnitude of the variation in k is high enough to produce the firm to transit from one risk
category to another, also the level of the market capital cost r may increase. Conversely,
raising k always reduces the actuarial price of the bankruptcy claim and sometimes also
reduces the cost of capital. An optimal capital principle will be derived in the next section,
based on an optimal compromise of bankruptcy costs and the market price of external debt.
5 Economic Capital as the Optimal Deductible
The value, per unit of investment, of firms that can borrow at the interest rate r (whose cost
of equity is given by Equation 12) is equal to:
V
I
= E[X+]− E[(X + k)−]− (r − r0) · k
Maximising value is then equivalent to minimise the total burden of default, equal to the
price of insurance (represented by the term E
[
(X + k)−
]
) plus the net benefit to be obtained
when investing capital at the interest rate r instead of maintaining it at the low (non-risky)
rate r0:
10Competition in product and factor markets should push utilities to a minimum level — eventually to zero.
Then only those activities generating substantial economic rents are able to generate substantial amounts of
free cash flow. Such activities are corresponded to product and factor markets where market forces are weak
and where monitoring is more important than ever (Jensen, 1986).
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min
k
E
[
(X + k)−
]
+ (r − r0) · k (13)
This problem has been already used to derive a rule of capital allocation by Dhaene et al.
(2003, 2008), Goovaerts et al. (2005) and also Laeven and Goovaerts (2004). They regard
its solution as an optimal solvency margin, which establishes a compromise between the cost
of capital on the one hand and the solvency requirements on the other. When justifying
the implementation of this rule, they emphasise that arbitrage opportunities are difficult to
exploit in insurance markets.
The first and second order conditions can be obtained by combining Equations 6 and 7:
d
dk
E
[
(X + k∗)−
]
+ r − r0 = −T−X(k∗) + r − r0 = 0
d2
∂k2
E
[
(X + k∗)−
]
= d
dk
F−X(k
∗) = f−X(k
∗) = P {X = −k∗} > 0
(14)
Therefore, as long as some capital loss is produced with non-zero probability, a range exists
where the term E
[
(X + k)−
]
is convex in k, and if additionally the marginal benefit of
adding the first unit of capital is greater than the net investment premium (i.e. if additionally
T−X(0) > r − r0), then a level of capital exists that minimises the criterion of Equation 13.
Under such circumstances, the optimal capital demand is determined by the quantile function
of the probability distribution of the series of capital losses of the underlying risk:
k∗ = T −1−X (r − r0) = F −1−X (1− r + r0) (15)
The optimal level of surplus is then expressed as the Value-at-Risk (or V aR) for the con-
fidence probability level ν = r − r0.11 The fact that the confidence level in the definition
of V aR is replaced by a net premium in Equation 15 is a consequence of the first-order
condition, which determines an exchange between a sure flow and a flow of probability (see
Equation 14). Thus, the higher the liquidity premium ν (i.e. the more the free-cash-flow
at disposal), the more expensive is to maintain a cash balance and hence the less capital
is demanded. Conversely, the lower this premium, the cheaper the capital and hence the
more the demanded quantity of this resource. The minimum and the maximum levels are
respectively chosen when ν ≥ 1 and when ν ≤ 0.
From the actuarial viewpoint, the expected excess loss E
[
(X + k)−
]
represents the fair
price of a special insuring contract (sometimes called layer) that obliges the insurer to pay
to the policyholder the excess of the loss over the level k, when such a loss is produced (see
Goovaerts, 1984). In this context, the amount k represents a guarantee provided by the
policyholder in order to assure the insurer (up to some extent) that every reasonable care
will be taken to reduce the underlying exposure. In other words, the guarantee k, which is
known as the deductible or retention in the literature, is introduced in insurance contracts
as a means of reducing the costs derived from moral-hazard. Within this framework, the
optimal level of capital defined in Equation 13 corresponds to the optimal deductible or
optimal retention of the related insuring liability contract.
11The reader not familiar with the concept of V aR can find a good survey in Hull (2000). The V aR has
been recommended for the implementation of good risk management practices by the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (2004).
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Notice, however, that full-coverage is implicitly assumed in the model, because the actuar-
ial prices of equity and insurance have been expressed in terms of mathematical expectations
that consider unlimited losses and gains over the level of capital (see Equation 5). But in-
surance contracts always specify a maximum payment in practice and full-coverage does not
actually exists in real markets. The question then arises of who does eventually bear the risk
of deposits. According to the terms of the guaranteeing contracts previously defined, we can
say that risk-bearing is roughly distributed in the following way: any loss up to the retention
level k is payed by the firm (recall that shareholders only endure the equity component of
the economic capital, kEQU ≤ k); losses that are higher than the retention level are payed by
the guarantor or insurer, as long as these losses do not surpasses a maximum disaster level
MDIS; finally, some companies can look for additional protection by establishing a contract
with some reinsurance institution that agrees to pay any loss greater than the disaster level
MDIS but lower than some catastrophe level MCAT . Thus, in the case of catastrophic events,
it is the society as a whole who has to afford the losses — through governmental divisions,
private creditors, companies and householders. This explains why it is in the interest of
regulators to define good practices and regulatory requirements that can induce financial
intermediaries to seek for protection according to the risk borne.
From the economic point of view, the existence of an optimal level of capital implies that
choosing a different level necessarily leads to over- or under-investment. Indeed, idle money,
that could be assigned to profitable investments, is maintained in excess when more capital
than the optimal is demanded. By contrast, when the stock of capital is lower than the
optimal level, risk is taken in excess, a fact that might eventually increase the frequency
of losses (as well as disaster and catastrophic events) and induce investors to raise their
concerns about the credit quality of the firm. The price at which the firm can attract debt
in the market might increase under such circumstances. Therefore, independently of whether
managers consider or not any of the optimisation problems established in Equations 5 or 13,
their capital preferences should approach to the solutions of these problems, for only following
this strategy the market value of firms can be maximised (or the burden of bankruptcy can
be minimised). On these grounds, the capital principles defined in Equations 10 and 15
can be regarded as decision variables, which provide a basis for the determination of the
aggregate behaviour of markets or multidivisional corporations. Thus, in particular, such
rules will be used later in Sections 8 and 9 to determine allocation mechanisms to be applied
inside centralised and decentralised organisations.
Having defined a principle to determine the optimal cash balance, the problem of dis-
tributing it inside multidivisional organisations will be addressed in the rest of the paper. As
explained later in Section 6, the main issues to be considered are informational asymmetries
(producing agency costs) inside institutions and how the decentralisation of capital decisions
can be used in the interest of the conglomerate as a whole. Specifically, an optimal centralised
allocation principle (depending on the beliefs of the central administration about the risks
taken by subsidiaries) will be defined in Section 8, and an optimal decentralised mechanism
will be proposed in Section 9, which leads to the centralised allocation at the time that
forces divisional managers to reveal their informational type. But then some mathematical
framework should be adopted allowing the risk or insurance principles E
[
(X − k)+
]
and
E
[
(X + k)−
]
to be distorted according to the preferences of decision-makers. As will be
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shown next in Section 7, the distorted-probability principle (which modify the probabilities
in the expectation operator) provides a characterisation that leads to an explicit separation
of the effects of risk and preferences in the capital structure. Such separation will allow
for a clear representation of the informational asymmetries between central and divisional
managers, as well as the costs derived from decentralisation.
6 The Allocation of Capital within Multidivisional Cor-
porations
As established in the previous sections, the prices of securities that produce random out-
comes are completely determined by risk. Then the insurance price of portfolios containing
such instruments are also dependent on risk and hence, every capital allocation principle
— distributing capital among the outstanding divisions of some multidivisional corporation
— should be strictly based on it (see, among others, Albrecht, 2004, and Goovaerts et al.,
2005). On these grounds, we will respectively denote as X1, . . . , Xn and K[X1], . . . , K[Xn]
the series of random P&L produced by divisions and the stand-alone capital requirements at
the divisional level, where the function K[·] is corresponded to some economic criterion. In
particular, the amount of capital demanded at the corporate level is given by K[X], where
(as before) the random variable X =
∑n
i=1 Xi denotes the aggregated P&L.
It is a well-known theoretical fact that when the variations of the portfolios held by
subsidiaries are not perfectly correlated, the losses suffered by some divisions can be at least
partially compensated by the gains obtained in others — i.e. divisions can partially hedge
or insure each other. It is then claimed that a benefit arises due to diversification, which
implies that the capital required at the aggregate level is generally lower than the sum of
the levels maintained by divisions when acting as independent units. In fact, provided that
the operator K[·] is convex, the Jensen’s inequality can be used to prove that (see Merton
and Perold, 1993):
K[X] ≤
n∑
i=1
K[Xi] (16)
Thus, in particular, some businesses that would be unprofitable on a stand-alone basis (due to
high capital requirements) might be profitable within a firm holding businesses with offsetting
risks. Under such conditions, the decentralisation of capital decisions might produce under-
investment and hence full-allocation is frequently mentioned as a desirable property:
n∑
i=1
Ki = K[X] , with Ki ≥ 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . , n (17)
where K1, . . . , Kn denote the levels of capital determined according to some centralised crite-
rion. In this context, the covariance allocation principle is introduced (see Albrecht, 2004):
Ki = E [Xi] +
Cov (X,Xi)
V ar[X]
· (K −E[X]) with X =
n∑
i=1
Xi
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Full-allocation is obtained as a consequence of the following properties of the expectation
and covariance operators:
E[X] =
n∑
i=1
E[Xi] and V ar[X] =
n∑
i=1
Cov (X,Xi)
Then the covariance principle satisfies the three properties just mentioned: it is risk-based,
it explicitly introduces covariances and finally, it fully allocates capital.
However, Merton and Perold (1993) have pointed out that full-allocation can also lead
to under-investment under certain circumstances and consequently, that such strategy does
not always correspond to the best practice. This claim can be understood by considering a
specific approach of allocating capital. Indeed, let us define the incremental capital require-
ment of some division as the amount of capital required at the corporate level K[X] minus
the capital required by the conglomerate when the particular business unit is eliminated:
IK [Xi] = K[X]−K [X −Xi] with X =
n∑
i=1
Xi
Thus, the incremental risk capital represents the minimum cash balance required to support
a certain business unit. It can be easily verified that for every n ≥ 2 the following identity
holds:
(n− 1) ·X =
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
Xj =
n∑
i=1
(X −Xi)
We can apply again the Jensen’s inequality (see the technical appendix in Merton and Perold,
1993) to obtain that:
(n− 1) ·K[X] ≤
n∑
i=1
K[X −Xi] =⇒
n∑
i=1
IK [Xi] ≤ K[X] (18)
Hence the sum of the incremental capitals is lower than the capital required at the aggregate
level and then full-allocation overstates the marginal capital requirements. In other words,
while the stand-alone allocation induces a loss in efficiency to the conglomerate (whenever
a convex principle K[·] is introduced), full-allocation can induce divisions to incur in a loss
of efficiency, for the sum of the minimum additional (or incremental) capital requirements is
lower than the level determined (according to the same principle) to the whole conglomerate.
On these grounds, Merton and Perold recommend do not fully allocate capital.12
Therefore, the main issue when specifying a capital allocation principle is how to simulta-
neously incorporate the preferences of central and divisional administrations. Discrepancies
inside institutions can be explained on the grounds of differing attitudes towards risk, as
12The principle can be naturally extended by considering the marginal-capital requirement, defined by
Myers and Read (2001) as the variation in the capital requirement in response to a marginal increment
in the exposition to risk, i.e. MK [Xi] = dK[X ]/dXi. But then full-allocation can be guaranteed only if
some conditions on the valuation function K[X ] are satisfied (see also Mildenhall, 2004, and Grundl and
Schmeiser, 2007).
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well as on differing expectations sustained by information and knowledge. Under such con-
ditions, the distribution of capital reflects the competition between divisional and central
managers on the one hand, and stockholders on the other, to take control of the funds
generated by the company. Denault (2001) has shown that the theory of coalitional games
can be used to build a model that explicitly characterises such competition. In the model,
subsidiaries choose between working as stand-alone entities and forming holdings (or coali-
tions) with other divisions. In this setting, the sub-additivity property (Equation 16) implies
that subsidiaries have incentives to form coalitions, since in this way they obtain a benefit
due to the reduction of the aggregate cost of bankruptcy. However, at the same time, the
super-additivity property (which in particular satisfies the incremental allocation principle,
see Equation 18) implies that the subsidiaries forming a certain coalition have incentives to
abandon it, as long as in this case the aggregate capital requirement is higher than the sum
of the optimal surpluses determined on a stand-alone basis. Within this theoretical frame-
work, Denault demonstrates that any coherent allocation principle should actually satisfy
full-allocation.
As will be shown later in Sections 8 and 9, the capital principle of Equation 22 can
be naturally adapted to characterise the divisional capital requirements in multi-businesses
corporations. Thus, an optimal centralised allocation principle is defined in Section 8, in the
sense that it minimises the sum of the insurance prices of the divisional excess losses. Later
in Section 9, an optimal mechanism is described that is based on the stand-alone optimal
levels of reserves, but that leads to the same aggregate requirements as in the centralised
allocation. The instrument of this mechanism is the internal cost of capital. We will first
digress from this topic in the next section, in order to provide a mathematical description
of the effect of expectations over actuarial prices, on which basis the allocation principles of
Sections 8 and 9 will be built.
7 The Distorted Demand for Capital
Within the framework of the well-known utility-theory of choice under risk, preferences are
uniquely corresponded to utility functions and economic decisions are based on the expected
utility:
Eu[X] =
∫
u(x) · dFX(x)
In fact, for any utility function u(·), the expected utility operator Eu[·] always provides an
order of risks. On these grounds, the process of decision-making can be described. Although
this framework has been already used for obtaining a demand for capital (or more generally,
a demand for liquidity, see Tobin, 1958, Holmstrom and Tirole, 2000, and Choi and Oh,
2003), the formulas obtained in this way are not really tractable and the description in terms
of preferences is dependent on the specification of the utility function. Besides, we prefer
extensions of the capital principle defined in Equations 13 and 15 that maintain its principal
features; in this context, we prefer to distort probabilities instead of payments, as long as
in this way the fundamental prescription given in Equation 15, relating the optimal level of
capital to the quantile of the underlying exposure, is preserved. In other words, we would
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like the distorted capital to be equal to the quantile of a distorted probability distribution.
According to this view, preferences directly affect the perceptions of risk maintained by
decision-makers.
Yaari (1987) has demonstrated that preferences can be alternatively corresponded to a
distortion function ϕ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] affecting the underlying probability distributions. On
this basis, the distorted expectation operator is defined:
Eϕ[X] =
∫
x dFϕ,X(x) =
∫
Tϕ,X(x) dx with Tϕ,X(x) = ϕ (TX(x)) ∀x (19)
where Fϕ,X = Pϕ{X ≤ x} and Tϕ,X = Pϕ{X > x} respectively denote the distorted cu-
mulative and the distorted tail probability functions representing the underlying risk. Wang
et al. (1997) have proved that the risk-principle introduced in Equation 19 satisfy a set
of good properties for the pricing of insurance claims. In particular, it preserves a class of
stochastic orders, meaning that it strictly depends on risk — i.e. more risky claims are given
higher prices and vice-versa. Besides, risk-lover and averse-to-risk attitudes are respectively
characterised by convex and concave distortion functions, for in these cases the expecta-
tion operator is respectively under and over-estimated. Risk-neutrality is represented by the
identity function ϕ(x) = x ∀x (see also Wang and Young, 1998).
Although the family of acceptable distortions (in the terms established by Yaari and
Wang) is broad, we will consider in the following the particular class of proportional-hazards
transforms, defined as ϕθ(p) = p
1
θ ∀p ∈ [0, 1], in such a way that the corresponding
risk-principle is now expressed as (see Wang, 1995):
Eθ[X] =
∫
x dFθ,X(x) =
∫
Tθ,X(x) dx with Tθ,X(x) = TX(x)
1
θ ∀x (20)
Consequently, the probability beliefs and hence the price of risk are amplified when θ > 1
and then this range of the distortion parameter θ accounts for the behaviour of averse-
to-risk individuals. Besides, the higher the magnitude of θ, the more the price of risk is
over-estimated and then the more the aversion-to-risk. Similarly, the price of risk is under-
estimated when θ < 1, so that in this way the behaviour of risk-lovers is characterised. Thus,
the lower the magnitude of θ, the lower the price of risk and then the more the preference
for risk. Risk-neutral decision-makers are characterised by θ = 1, in which case the distorted
probability principle is equal to the traditional expectation operator.
The capital principle defined in Equations 13 and 15 can be naturally extended to the
risk pricing framework based on the distorted-probability principle defined in Equation 20:
min
k
Eθ
[
(X + k)−
]
+ (r − r0) · k (21)
with Eθ [(X + k)−] = −
∫ −k
−∞
(x+ k) · dFθ,X(x) (see Equation 6). The Leibnitz’s integral rule
can be invoked once again to derive the first-order condition, as in the non-distorted case
(see Equation 14), in such a way that the optimal demand for capital is given by the inverse
function of the distorted tail-probability:
kθ,X(r − r0) = T−1θ,−X(r − r0) = F−1θ,−X(1− r + r0) (22)
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or equivalently:
kθ,X(r − r0) = T−1−X
(
(r − r0)θ
)
= F−1−X(1− (r − r0)θ)
Discrepancies relative to preferred cash-balances can thus be explained on the basis of the
underlying risks, preferences and the opportunity cost of capital. Notice that although in
Equation 22 the parameter θ eventually affects the cost of capital, from the mathematical
point of view it is not this variable but rather the underlying probability distribution what
is distorted, a fact that has been stressed by choosing the notation Fθ,X and Tθ,X . The
reader should not confuse this setting, where expectations distort the risk perceptions of
decision-makers, with that of heterogeneous estimations of the cost of capital.
8 An Optimal Risk-Based Allocation Rule for Cen-
tralised Organisations
Let X and K respectively denote the aggregate exposure and the level of capital maintained
by some financial conglomerate, and let X1, . . . , Xn and K1, . . . , Kn respectively denote the
series of capital returns of the portfolios held by its subsidiaries and their corresponding cash
balances. Consistently with the capital principle defined in Equations 21 and 22, we look for
a rule based on the residual risks of subsidiaries. A criterion is thus required to compare the
sum of the subsidiaries’ residual risks, equal to
∑n
i=1(Ii ·Xi+Ki)−, with the conglomerate’s
residual exposure (I ·X+K)−, where I1, . . . , In and I =
∑n
i=1 Ii respectively denote the levels
of investment maintained by subsidiaries and the conglomerate, with I ·X =∑ni=1 Ii ·Xi.
The comparison of random variables can be carried out with the help of the concept of
stochastic precedence. Indeed, a random variableX is said to precede another random variable
Y (or equivalently, a random variable Y is said to dominate X) in the first stochastic order
if and only if at every point it accumulates less probability in the tails of the distribution
function (see Goovaerts et al., 1984):
X ≤ Y ⇔ P {X > k} ≤ P {Y > k} ∀k ⇔ TX(k) ≤ TY (k) ∀k (23)
This is a convenient order indeed, for the optimal level of capital is expressed in Equations 15
and 22 in terms of the tail probability. Moreover, it can be demonstrated that the following
inequality holds with probability one for the first stochastic-order:
(I ·X +K)− ≤
∑n
i=1(Ii ·Xi +Ki)−
where ∑n
i=1 Ki ≤ K
Recall that, as stated by Denault, the property of super-additivity (which states that
∑n
i=1 Ki ≤
K) implies that there are incentives for divisions to leave the conglomerate and to form in-
dependent firms. From the inequality above we obtain that a benefit exists, resulting from
the reduction in the riskiness of the conglomerate’s portfolio with respect to the sum of the
divisional portfolios, that can be shared with divisions to put incentives on them to remain
in the conglomerate.
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It can be proved as well that the first stochastic order is preserved by the distorted-
probability principle (defined in Equations 19 and 20), in such a way that, for any informa-
tional type θ:
Eθ [(I ·X +K)−] ≤
∑n
i=1 Eθ [(Ii ·Xi +Ki)−]
where ∑n
i=1 Ki ≤ K
Given some level of aggregate investment I > 0, define the following weights:
ωi =
Ii
I
∀i =⇒
n∑
i=1
ωi = 1
Hence, letting k = K/I and ki = Ki/Ii, with i = 1, . . . , n, respectively denote the cash-to-
risk ratios maintained by the conglomerate and subsidiaries, we obtain that:
Eθ [(X + k)−] ≤
∑n
i=1 ωi · Eθ [(Xi + ki)−]
where ∑n
i=1 ωi · ki ≤ k
An allocation principle can then be naturally introduced, which minimises the weighted sum
of the expectations of the residual risks:
mink1,...,kn
∑n
i=1 ωi · Eθ [(Xi + ki)−]
such that ∑n
i=1 ωi · ki = k
(24)
Such allocation principle ensures the sum of the expected insured returns of subsidiaries is
as close as possible to the lower bound Eθ [(X + k)−].
As in the previous sections, the solution to the problem of Equation 24 can be obtained
by applying Lagrange optimisation. In fact, the first-order conditions are now written as:
∂
∂ki
∑n
i=1 ωi · Eθ [(Xi + k∗i )−] + λ · ωi = (−Tθ,−Xi (k∗i ) + λ) · ωi = 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . , n
∑n
i=1 ωi · k∗i − k = 0
(25)
Combining both equations leads the Lagrange multiplier λ to be determined by:
n∑
i=1
ωi · k∗i =
n∑
i=1
ωi · T −1θ,−Xi(λ) = k
Besides, since T −1θ,−ωi·Xi = ωi · T −1θ,−Xi ∀ ωi > 0, we obtain:
n∑
i=1
T −1θ,−ωi·Xi(λ) = k with X =
n∑
i=1
ωi ·Xi
The question then arises of whether there is some dependence structure for which the sum
of the quantiles is expressed as the quantile of the sum of the individual exposures, for in
this case it would be possible to obtain a close expression for the multiplier λ.
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In fact, as demonstrated by Dhaene et al. (2002), the property of the sum of the quantiles
mathematically characterises the comonotonic dependence structure, where comonotonicity
represents a case of extreme dependence, when no diversification effect can be attained by
pooling risks together. In fact, given a random vector (X1, . . . , Xn) with marginal cumu-
lative distribution functions (FX1 , . . . , FXn), the comonotonic random vector (X
c
1, . . . , X
c
n)
is mathematically defined in such a way that if U denotes the random variable uniformly
distributed in the interval [0, 1], such that FU(u) = u ∀ u ∈ [0, 1], FU(u) = 0 ∀ u < 0 and
FU(u) = 1 ∀ u > 1, the following identity holds in distributions:
(Xc1, . . . , X
c
n) =
(
F−1X1 (U), . . . , F
−1
Xn
(U)
)
In this way, the realisation of a single event (related to the uniform random variable U)
simultaneously determines all the components of any comonotonic random vector. Moreover,
since the functions
(
F−1X1 , . . . , F
−1
Xn
)
are all non-decreasing, all the components of the vector
(Xc1, . . . , X
c
n) move in the same direction. Hence, as already stated, the quantile function of
the sum of the components of any comonotonic random vector is equal to the sum of the
component quantile functions, a fact that supports the use of the comonotonic dependence
structure to characterise the aggregate demand for cash balances.
Let Tθ,Xc denote the tail-probability of the comonotonic sum X
c = ω1 · Xc1 + . . . + ωn ·
Xcn, where (X
c
1, . . . , X
c
n) represents the comonotonic random vector with the same marginal
distributions as (X1, . . . , Xn). Then, from the first-order conditions written in Equation 25
we obtain that:
T −1θ,−Xc(λ) =
n∑
i=1
T −1θ,−ωi·Xci
(λ) =
n∑
i=1
T −1θ,−ωi·Xi(λ) = k with X
c =
n∑
i=1
ωi ·Xci
where Tθ,−Xc =
(∑n
i=1 T
−1
θ,−ωi·Xi
)−1
denotes the distribution function of the comonotonic sum.
Hence the Lagrange multiplier is equal to:
λ = Tθ,−Xc(k) (26)
while the optimal allocation rule is given by:
k∗i = T
−1
θ,−Xi
(λ) = T −1θ,−Xi (Tθ,−Xc(k)) ∀ i = 1, . . . , n (27)
Thus, from the mathematical point of view, the optimal levels of capital are corresponded
to the projections over the subspaces determined by the individual risks. This interpretation
is consistent with the fact that the problem of Equation 24 actually minimises a distance,
as stated by Goovaerts et al. (2004) and also Laeven and Goovaerts (2004).
The optimal allocation determined in Equation 27 depends on the level of capital k
chosen for the conglomerate. This capital is supposed to depend on the market conditions,
i.e. on the market price of capital. When central managers choose the level that minimises
the criterion of Equation 21, the optimal level of capital for the conglomerate depends on
the net return r − r0 as in Equation 22:
kθ,Xc = T
−1
θ,−Xc(r − r0) (28)
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Replacing the optimal level k∗ in Equation 26 leads the Lagrange multiplier to be given by:
λ = Tθ,−Xc
(
T −1θ,−Xc(r − r0)
)
= r − r0 (29)
Thus the Lagrange multiplier is equal to the net return on capital — a fact that is consis-
tent with the interpretation of the Lagrange multiplier as a shadow price. Replacing λ in
Equation 27 leads to the optimal allocation rule:
kθ,Xi = T
−1
θ,−Xi
(r − r0) ∀ i = 1, . . . , n (30)
Accordingly, the optimal levels of capital correspond to the levels that central managers
would choose for the divisional risks on the grounds of their net return on capital r − r0
and their expectations (represented by the informational type θ). On these grounds, it is
regarded as a centralised allocation.
9 Capital Allocation as an Optimal Decentralised Mech-
anism
Subsidiaries that are allowed to choose their capital structures on their own interest solve
the problem of Equation 21:
min
ki
Eθi
[
(Xi + ki)−
]
+ (r − r0) · ki (31)
The stand-alone allocation of capital is thus determined according to Equation 22:
kθi,Xi = T
−1
θi,−Xi
(r − r0) ∀ i = 1, . . . , n (32)
Comparing Equations 30 and 32, we notice that the centralised and stand-alone allocations
differ due to differing expectations between central and divisional managers, i.e. due to
differences in the parameters θ and θi. A loss of efficiency is then produced at the corporate
level. Indeed, under-investment occurs at the corporate level when
∑n
i=1 kθi,Xi > kθ,Xc and
over-investment when
∑n
i=1 kθi,Xi < kθ,Xc. Similarly, preferring the centralised allocation
respectively leads to under- and over-investment at the divisional level when kθ,Xi > kθi,Xi
and when kθ,Xi > kθi,Xi.
Therefore, deciding between the centralised and the stand-alone allocations of capital is
just a matter of preferences. Those central administrations that are confident in their own
estimations will prefer to rely on the centralised allocation. Others will try to incorporate,
at least partially, the view of divisional managers. The principle of Equation 32 explicitly
serves this purpose. Indeed, let k1, . . . , kn denote the surpluses prefer by divisional managers,
in such a way that, from Equation 32 we obtain:
r − r0 = Tθi,−Xi(ki) = T−Xi(ki)
1
θi =⇒ θi = log T−Xi(ki)
log (r − r0) ∀ i = 1, . . . , n (33)
Hence, given any risk Xi and a level of capital ki, the liquidity premium r−r0 and the infor-
mational type θ are related to each other. Accordingly, as long as the central administration
21
force subsidiaries to invest their balances at some internal return ρ (instead of the risk-free
interest rate r0), they are force to act on the interest of the conglomerate at the time that
their types are revealed.
Such a mechanism can be explicitly defined in the form of an optimal contract, as sug-
gested by Diamond and Verrecchia (1982):
mink,ρ Eθ [(X + k)−] + (r − r0) · k
subject to
ki = argminki Eθi [(Xi + ki)−] + (r − ρ) · ki ∀ i = 1, . . . , n
∑n
i=1 ωi · ki = k
As long as the optimal stand-alone allocations are given by Equation 32, the contract can
be equivalently established in the following way:
mink,ρ Eθ [(X + k)−] + (r − r0) · k
subject to ∑n
i=1 ωi · kθi,Xi(r − ρ) = k
(34)
Letting λ denote the Lagrange multiplier, we obtain that the optimal level of capital at the
corporate level k∗ and the optimal internal return on capital ρ∗ are given by the first-order
conditions:
d
dk
Eθ [(X + k
∗)−] + (r − r0)− λ = −Tθ,X (k∗) + (r − r0)− λ = 0
λ ·∑ni=1 ωi · k′θi,Xi(r − ρ∗) · (−1) = 0 =⇒ λ = 0
∑n
i=1 ωi · kθi,Xi(r − ρ∗) =
∑n
i=1 ωi · T −1θi,−Xi(r − ρ∗) =
∑n
i=1 T
−1
θi,−ωi·Xi
(r − ρ∗) = k∗
Therefore, if Tθ1,...,θn,Xc denotes the tail-probability function of the comonotonic sum with
marginal distributions (Tθn,−ω1·X1, . . . , Tθn,−ωn·Xn), i.e. Tθ1,...,θn,Xc =
(∑n
i=1 T
−1
θi,−ωi·Xi
)−1
, we
obtain:
ρ∗ = r − Tθ1,...,θn,Xc (k∗) = r − Tθ1,...,θn,Xc
(
T −1θ,−Xc(r − r0)
)
with:
k∗ = T −1θ,−Xc(r − r0) (35)
But the parameters θ1, . . . , θn are actually not observed by central managers, which
means that this allocation cannot be implemented in practice. As a solution, we can assume
that first central managers have estimations θˆ1, . . . , θˆn of the types of divisional managers
— which can be determined on the basis of experience or previous allocations. Then the
optimal internal return on capital should be defined as:
ρ∗ = r − Tθˆ1,...,θˆn,Xc
(
T −1θ,−Xc(r − r0)
)
(36)
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Replacing r0 = ρ
∗ in Equation 32, we obtain that the decentralised optimal allocation of
capital is attained at the levels:
k∗i = T
−1
θi,−Xi
(r − ρ∗) = T −1θi,−Xi
(
Tθˆ1,...,θˆn,Xc
(
T −1θ,−Xc(r − r0)
)) ∀ i = 1, . . . , n (37)
Notice that the optimal internal cost of capital is equal to the external cost of capital only
when central managers access to the private information of subsidiaries (and as long as they
agree to incorporating it into decision-making), at the time that the proper comonotonic
portfolio characterises the aggregated exposure. Then the liquidity premium, equal to the
difference between the external and the optimal internal costs of capital, explicitly measures
the disagreement between central and divisional managers.
The optimal mechanism can then be implemented in the following way. In Stage 1,
based on their experience and information, central managers determine estimations of the
informational types of subsidiaries, θˆ1, . . . , θˆn. In case that only poor information is available,
they can assume that divisional managers are risk-neutrals and accordingly choose θˆ1 =
· · · = θˆn = 1. In Stage 2, divisions are asked to freely decide their levels of reserves. The
conditions of the contract are such that although subsidiaries can invest in the market to
obtain the return r, they can only invest their cash reserves in a special agreement with
the central administration to obtain the return ρ∗. In the final Stage 3, central managers
use the allocations of Stage 2 to renew their estimations of the types of subsidiaries from
Equation 33. In this way, divisional managers reveal their types.
In the model proposed by Stoughton and Zechner (2007), divisional managers are char-
acterised by their attitude-towards-risk and the effort they expend to acquire information.
Divisional cash flows are increased when more information is accessed. An informational pa-
rameter is then supposed to augment the expected value of the investment in a multiplicative
fashion. Risk is described by volatility and decisions are affected by the net cost of capital. As
in the model of Merton and Perold (1993), the economic capital is proportional to volatility.
The internal cost of capital (fixed by central managers) is used as a tool to give incentives to
subsidiaries to act in the general interest of the firm. Thus, capital allocation is justified as
part of a general mechanism that stimulates the exchange of information between central and
divisional managers inside the institution. As a result, sometimes subsidiaries voluntarily
reduce their exposure to risk and assign their cash excesses to less productive investments.
So distortions can be present in the model in the form of under- and over-investment.
The interpretation of Stoughton and Zechner naturally applies to the mechanism stated
above. Besides, the alternative expressions provided for the external and internal costs of
capital can be easily implemented and are naturally corresponded to economic concepts.13
Finally, as demonstrated in the following section, in the particular case when risks are de-
scribed by the Gaussian probability distribution, the optimal capital principle of Equation 22
extends the capital rule proposed by Merton and Perold (1993). This result is consistent
with the fact that this principle has been established as an extension of the model of Merton
and Perold, applicable to the case when decision makers cannot hedge fully and are obliged
to rely on insurance and reinsurance to carry on with their business activities.
13Thus, while the external capital cost is related to the actuarial price of excess-cash-flow, the internal
cost of capital is related to an optimal agreement between central and divisional managers.
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Table 1: The Optimal Capital Principle under Different Risk Parametrisations
Tail Probability Optimal Capital Principle
Gaussian T (x) = 1− Φ (µ+x
σ
) ∀ x k(ν) = σ · Φ−1 (1− νθ)− µ
with Φ(x) = 1√
2pi
· ∫ x−∞ exp
(
− y22
)
dy ∀x with ν = r − r0
Log-Normal T (x) = 1− Φ
(
µ+ln(x)
σ
)
∀ x k(ν) = exp (σ ·Φ−1 (1− νθ)− µ)
Exponential T (x) = exp
(
C−x
β
)
∀ x ≥ 0 k(ν) = C − (θ · β) · ln(ν)
Paretian T (x) =
(
x
B
) 1
α ∀ 0 < x < B k(ν) = B · νθ·α
10 The Optimal Capital Principle for Some Well-Known
Probability Distributions
An appealing feature of the capital principle defined in this paper is its adaptability to any
family of probability distributions. As a consequence, the capital requirements of different
types of risks can be described on the same basis and hence, the model can be also im-
plemented in institutions that hold securities exposed to non-homogeneous risks. This is
particularly the case of insurance companies, that simultaneously deal with highly standard-
ised policies, such as car and fire insurance, as well as some individual contracts involving
high payments depending on events of low probability. This is also the case of some financial
conglomerates that hold standard financial securities (transacted in highly liquid markets),
as well as non-liquid derivatives and claims contingent on disaster and catastrophic events.
Explicit analytic expressions are obtained for a wide class of well-known probability
distributions. In Table 1, some of these expressions are presented in terms of the liquidity
premium ν = r− r0. In Figure 1, the optimal capital requirements are depicted for some of
the risk classes presented in Table 1. Notice that, given any level of the liquidity premium, the
optimal cash balance under Paretian risks is always higher than the cash balance demanded
under Exponential risks, which in turn is always higher than the optimal capital under
Gaussian risks. In fact, Paretian tails are uniformly greater than Exponential, which in
turn are greater than Gaussian tails. This means that, according to the first-stochastic
order, Gaussian risks are dominated by Exponential risks, which in turn are dominated by
Paretian risks (see Equation 23 and the related discussion in Section 7). Therefore, the
optimal capital principle consistently assigns higher surpluses to riskier claims and hence, it
is strictly risk-based.
As depicted in Figure 2, the Gaussian optimal principle (obtained when the underlying
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Figure 1: The Optimal Capital Principle of Neutral Decision Makers
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exposure follows a Gaussian probability distribution) follows a straight line in the plane of
cash-to-risk ratios and standard deviations (used as estimators of volatilities). This is also
the case of the allocation rule of Merton and Perold, because (as stated in the technical
appendix of Merton and Perold, 1993) the formula of risk capital (per unit invested on net
assets) can be approximated by:
kMP = 0.4 · σ
√
T
where T and σ respectively denote the time to maturity and the standard deviation of the
series of P&L of the net assets’ portfolio. In Figure 2, the value T = 1 has been assumed.
Therefore, while the capital principle of Merton and Perold intersects the capital axe at
the origin and has a constant slope (equal to 0.4), the optimal principle intersects at the
inverse of the mean return µ of net assets and its slope depends on the liquidity premium
ν. This means, in particular, that at low volatilities firms that obtain capital profits (with
µ > 0) prefer to lend all their balances and do not maintain reserves at all. In fact, they
only demand capital when:
σ · Φ−1(1− νθ)− µ > 0 ⇔ σ > µ
Φ−1(1− νθ)
This result is consistent with the behaviour of firms that own free-cash-flow (see Section 2).
On the other hand, firms that obtain capital losses (with µ < 0), choose a level of reserves
equal to the mean loss of net assets, i.e. k = −µ, when σ = 0.
On the other hand, the slope Φ−1(1 − νθ) of the optimal capital line depends on the
distorted liquidity premium. Lower liquidity premiums imply that firms hold less cash in
excess and hence that they are willing to exchange more capital by any unit of incremented
volatility (in particular, the slope tends to +∞ when ν → 0). Averse-to-risk and risk-lover
decision-makers (respectively characterised by θ > 1 and θ < 1, see Section 7) respectively
under- and over-estimates the premium for liquidity. Moreover, since Φ−1(1− νθ) < 0 when
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Figure 2: The Optimal Capital Line and the Allocation Rule of Merton and Perold (1993)
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ν > 0.5, the slope of the capital line turns negative in this case. Accordingly, and contrary to
the common intuition, the capital requirements may decrease with the level of volatility if the
liquidity premium is sufficiently high (see the graph to the right lower corner in Figure 2).
Eventually, when the volatility surpasses a certain level (depending on the expected return
µ and the premium ν > 0.5) firms prefer to lend all their balances.
In conclusion, the optimal capital principle determines an optimal capital line in the
Gaussian case, which relates the optimal proportion of reserves in terms of the mean return
and the volatility of the underlying risk, as well as the premium for liquidity offered in the
market. The Merton’s principle is obtained as a particular case of the optimal capital line
when risks are Gaussian with µ = 0 and Φ−1(1 − νθ) = 0.4, i.e. when νθ = 1 − Φ(0.4) ≈
34.25% (see the graph to the left lower corner in Figure 2). This situation can be naturally
corresponded to a competitive environment, where firms obtain no capital P&L (µ = 0) and
the distorted liquidity premium is high enough (νθ ≈ 34.25%). Recall that the optimal capital
principle has been obtained as an extension of the option-based Merton’s principle — both
are based on the net assets’ claim, whose payments at maturity are given in Equation 4.
The optimal capital principle defined in this paper is thus meaningful from the economic
point of view.
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11 Conclusions
Firms that continuously trade capital and securities demand no cash reserves, for they can
fit their balances at any moment through borrowing and lending (Modigliani and Miller,
1958). In fact, as proved by Merton (1974, 1997), although the market prices of equity and
deposit insurance (which are the main components of the capital structure) actually depend
on the level of reserves, the value of firms does not depend on it (see also Miller, 1998). This
result is a consequence of the fact that continuous hedging suppresses risk.
However, when firms face restrictions on liquidity (in other words, when borrowing and
lending may change the price of capital if the transacted amounts break on through certain
thresholds) the capital structure determines the agency costs and the moral-hazard implicit in
the contracts that managers respectively establish with stockholders and customers. Hence
the market prices of equity and deposit insurance should be determined on an actuarial
basis. As demonstrated in this paper, an optimal cash balance then exists, which leads to
an optimal capital principle that is consistent with economic fundamentals and is easy to
implement for a wide class of probability distributions. Moreover, since the level of capital
is explicitly related to the deductible or retention of the corresponding insurance contract, it
explicitly represents the moral-hazard on the side of customers.
In particular, when the underlying risk follows a Gaussian probability distribution, an
optimal capital line is obtained relating the optimal proportion of capital to the standard
deviation. This principle naturally extends the capital allocation rule proposed by Merton
and Perold (1993).
Finally, the allocation of capital to the subsidiaries of multidivisional corporations is
determined by the differences in skills, information and aversion-to-risk of central and divi-
sional managers. This means that central and local administrations do not always agree on
which combinations of debt and capital lead to under- and over-investment.
The capital principle defined in this paper can be extended in such a way that a single
informational type modify expectations. The differences in expectations can be explicitly
measured in this way. Two different allocation principles can be defined on this basis, the
one of which is applicable to centralised and the other to decentralised organisations. In
fact, an optimal mechanism can be established for the distribution of capital, which allows
subsidiaries to independently choose their capital structures, at the time that leads the
conglomerate to collect the same aggregate balance as under the centralised allocation. The
implementation of the mechanism forces subsidiaries to reveal their types. In this context, the
optimal mechanism can be used as a tool to stimulate the exchange of information between
central and divisional administrations.
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